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12. THE STATE AND THE DEFENCE COMMITTEES IN THE GHANAIAN REVOLUTION,
1981-1984
by P. Konings *"-" A~
After the 31st December 1981 coup the new regime in Ghana, the
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), promised to bring about a
'real' revolution in Ghana and to mobilize the 'people1 towards
participation in the revolution. The rapid establishment of 'Defence
Committees' among the 'people' was the institutional expression of the
new regime's determination to mobilize the masses for the revolution.
Mobilization politics, according to Petras (1969: 5), can take
two alternative approaches to reorganizing society and these appear to
me to be of relevance to mass mobilization within the Ghanaian
'revolution' during the years 1981-1984:
- the corporatist approach, 'whereby the government controls and
directs lower-class associations and links them with existing economie
elites in an attempt to encourage collaboration for national
development'; and
- the col lectivist approach, 'whereby class-conscious political
actors communicate a radical political culture among lower-class
individuals in order to mobilize their support and to undermine
existing elites as the first phase toward the creation of a
collectivist society'.
It will be demonstrated in this study that these two alternative
approaches towards reorganizing society became a source of tense
conflict within the leadership of what soon came to be cal led the
'national democratie' revolution. From the very beginning of the
revolution the ruling 'petty-bourgeoisie' became divided on the basis
of the fundamental issues of ideology and strategy reflected in the
type of class alliances to be established in the 'first phase1 of the
'national democratie' revolution. Although the 'revolutionary'
leadership seemed to be able to accommodate a number of fractions with
different ideological positions, two fractions were, according to me,
initially dominant:
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(i) One fraction - loyal to the chairman of the PNDC, Flt-Lt.
J.J. Rawlings, the charismatic leader and apparently almost the
'dictator' of the revolution - adhering to a (moderate or radical)
kind of 'national populism' (Sandbrook 1982: 99-102; Erickson 1975,
and 1977). This ideology emphasizes evidently two main objectives:
- national ism: it is in essence anti-imperialist and seeks to
mobilizë all class forces in society so as to achieve 'national
development' and, ultimately, a basically self-reliant, independent
economy free from foreign domination.
- populism: although it Champions a broad 'national front' in its
struggle for national recovery and development, it actually seeks to
portray a particular attachment to the 'working masses'. In contrast
to socialism, however, i t does not advocate fundamental changes in the
relations of production, but certain reforms within the status quo
which are of benefit to the 'working masses', in particular a more
equitable distribution of income.
This ideology seems to contain a number of ambiguities. For
instance, how is one to reconcile the 'national interest' of a broad
'national front' with the 'particular interests' of the 'working
masses'? The 'tactics' of an alliance with all classes in society in
the national struggle for economie independence is indeed likely to
stifle any championship of the workers' interests. A retreat to a
merely nationalist position and a demobilization (rather than a
mobilization) of the 'working masses' may readily present themselves
as final 'solutions' to the ambiguities posed by 'national populism'.
(ii) Another - opposing - fraction of the ('petty-bourgeois')
leadership wanted to 'commit suïcide' identifying downwards with the
working class and aimed at the establishment of working class power in
Ghanaian society. It adhered to a kind of socialist ideology and
sought to mobilizë and educate the working class towards a continuous
class struggle in Ghanaian 'neo-colonial' society in order to
ultimately establish working class hegemony in Ghanaian society. To
this end, the 'first phase' of the 'national democratie' revolution,
according to this fraction, should attempt to effect some structural
changes in Ghanaian society, including the liquidation of the
exploitative relations of production, the establishment of a political
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power bloc representing a broad social spectrum but under the
leadership of the working class and its organizations, and the
creation of an ideological and legal framework corresponding tot the
proposed structural changes (1).
A conflict arose between these two fractions in the course of the
'revolutionary1 process about the way of mobil i zing the
'revolutionary1 mass organizations established by the PNDC, the
Defence Committees: the 'nationalist populist' fraction was
increasingly inclined to adopt a corporatist approach while the
socialist fraction stuck to a collectivist one.
Enckson (1975 and 1977) has attempted to demonstrate a close
link between populism and a corporatist approach to mass organizations
in Latin America; and his arguments seem to apply to Ghana as well.
Populism emphasizing charismatic leadership, class reconciliation and
reformism within a capitalist framework,is, according to him, likely
to become an ideology and movement of the status quo and to provide
only negligible benefits to the working class. Incapable of
'del i vering the goods' to the working cass i t is tempted to check and
channel the potentially dangerous power of the embryonic working class
and to impede the development of autonomous working class
organizations. Undoubtedly, Erickson is right in pointing out that the
various ambiguities inherent to populism may induce populist leaders
to adopt a corporatist approach to mass organizations; however, hè
tends to overlook that these leaders' actual attempts of controlling
mass organizations may not always be (wholly) successful. The mass
organizations established by populist regimes themselves may even
start (and continue to stimulate) autonomous actions which oppose and
challenge these regimes if they stop championing working class
interests and producing the expected benefits. Sandbrook (1982: 102)
acutely observes in this respect:
'Although populist governments have been unwilling to permit
autonomous class organization from below, corporatist
organizational efforts can nevertheless gain a momentum of their
own. Organization, even if controlled, brings workers together;
i t creates the potential for the demands of workers to transcend
the limits set by the authorities'.
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Although the 'nationalist populist' fraction within the
leadership of the Ghanaian 'revolution' was finally able to overcome
the Opposition from the si de of the socialist fraction - the latter
having been largely in charge of the Organisation and politicisation
of the Defence Committees and having consistently advocated a
collectivist approach to mass mobilization -, its corporatist approach
has proved to be only partly successful. The Defence Committees have
continued to undertake autonomous actions to defend workers'
interests, to assert populär power in the 'revolution1, and to put
pressure on the populist regime to 'speed up the pace of the
revolution'.
THE REVOLUTION AND POPULÄR POWER
After having seized power for the second time in Ghana on the 31 st of
December 1981, Flt-Lt. J.J. Rawlings, the chairman of the PNDC,
insisted that the new regime intended to go beyond the 'moral'
revolution and 'house cleaning Operation' that had been the earmark of
the short Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) administration in
1979 (2). And hè promised to accomplish a true socio-economic
transformation of the country and to actively involve the 'people' who
had been deprived of any politica! power in the past, in the
decisi on-making process of the revolution (3).
The PNDC published its policy guidelines in May 1982 (4). This
document described the initial stage in the revolutionary process as
the 'national democratie phase' which was characterized as
1anti-imperialist, anti-neo-colonialist and aiming at instituting
populär democracy'. The 'national democratie' revolution, therefore,
was oriented at the achievement of two main goals:
- to restructure the country along nationalistic lines to lead it
into 'economie self-sufficiency, self-dependency and genuine economie
independence';
- to put power in the hands of the people and to ensure their genuine
participation in decision-making processes.
'People's power' and 'populär participation' would be
institutionalised by the creation of People's Defence Committees
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(POCs) and Werkers' Defence Committees (WDCs) within the local
communities and places of work respectively. These 'revolutionary
organs' would be the vanguard in the national and democratie struggle
for the total transformation of Ghanaian society.
The foundation for 'power to the people' - the slogan of the
revolution written on a million walls and sung in thousands of
pol itical rallies - had been l ai d already before the 31st December
1981 coup. 'People's power' had been one of the main political demands
of the various progressive, left-wing organizations of students and
scholars which had emerged in Ghana since the 4th June 1979 uprising
leading to the establishment af the AFRC administration. The most
important of these organizations were the June Fourth Movement (JFM),
the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), the People's
Revolutionary League of Ghana (PRLG), and the New Democratie Movement
(NDM). Although we should not underestimate the intense conflicts
existing between these various organizations based on personal
rivalries and ideological and strategie differences, they seem to
agree on some basic principles: they tend to attribute Ghana's
underdevelopment and the working masses' precarious living Standards
to the continuous exploitation by ' imperalism' , multinationals and
their local allies and aim at the creation of a kind of socialist
society. The initiation of a 'populär revolution1 and the
establishment of 'people's power' were considered to be necessary
prerequisites for the ultimate attack on the external and internal
exploiters of the working class. 'People's power' had a definite class
content and would involve a fierce class struggle: it was oriented at
the establishment of working class hegemony under the leadership of a
revolutionary vanguard and the destruction of the neo-colonial class
structure. These organizations were committed to working class
struggles and some of them had actually started to organise and
politici se the working masses before the 31st December 1981 coup.
The June Fourth Movement (JFM), for example, called for the
formation of 'revolutionary committees' in local communities and
places of work during the celebrations marking the second anniversary
of the 4th June 1979 uprising. And a few months later cadres were sent
into the regions to realise the installation of revolutionary
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committees in the regional capita!s from where the formation of such
committees should spread to other parts of the regions. It should be
noted that several members of the (future) PNDC, like Rawlings, Chris
Atim and Kojo Tsikata, had enjoyed leadership positions within the
JFM. No wonder that the PNDC cal l for the formation of PDCs and WDCs
was well received by the JFM and most other progressive organizations.
The JFM was particularly confident - because of the previously close
connections between its organization and several PNDC members - that
the Installation of the Defence Conimittees would initially lead to a
real contribution of the working masses to the decisi on-making process
within the revolution and finally pave the way for a working class
government.
THE COLLECTIVIST APPROACH TO MASS MOBILIZATION
Several members of Ghana's progressive, left-wing organizations were
charged by the PNDC with the organization of the Defence Commi ttees.
Remarkably, they were not chosen as representatives of their
organizations, but rather on the merit of their personal capacities.
It was a great disappointment for the progressive organizations
to discover during the very first days of the revolution that the PNDC
declined their offer of political guidance in the revolutionary
process. Both the PNDC itself and the cabinet appointed by the PNDC
seemed to lack any ideological coherence; this constituted a clear
obstacle to the drawing-up of a consistent and determined
revolutionary programme (Konings 1983). The appointment of a number of
well-known liberal and conservative politicians in the first cabinet
without any regard for the numerous protests from progressive ei rel es
in Ghana showed that the PNDC - faced with a serious economie crisis
and hostility from the si de of those social forces opposed to any
revolutionary changes (Jeffries 1982a; Kraus 1982; and Brittain 1983)
- seemed to be inclined to accept 'compromises' and to sacrifice
'ideology' on the altar of real pol i tik and pragmatism.
The PNDC did not wish to take into account 'populär' opinion and
to be 'dictated' by the progressive organizations regarding its
policies - in spite of its constant emphasis on the importance of
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'participatory democracy' in the revolution. In actual fact almost all
policy decisions within the revolutionary process were taken by
Rawlings himself in close co-operation with the Special Adviser to the
PNDC, Capt. (ret.) Kojo Tsikata; the PNDC as a body rarely held
meetings.
The progressive organizations could be easily by-passed by the
PNDC for the following reasons: (i) they were ill-prepared for the
revolution; and (ii) they were disunited and unable to co-operate
during this vital period in Ghanaian history because of personal
ammosities and conflicting views on revolutionary strategy.
Having been put aside with regard to charting the ideological
orientation of the new regime, individual members of the progressive
organizations welcomed the PNDC's invitation to set up the Defence
Commitees and monitor their activities. They soon recognized that the
formation of strong, class-conscious mass organizations could be an
alternative or more appropriate way of effecting revolutionary changes
in society and of attacking the neo-colonial class structure: the
establishment of a revolution 'from below' was more likely to be
successful than a revolution organised 'from above' by a leadership
that seemed to be either unable or unwilling to draw up a
revolutionary programme. In addition, such strong, class-conscious
mass organizations might even be able to put pressure on the 'populär'
regime in power so that a more revolutionary programme would be
adopted.
The PNDC established (interim) co-ordinating committees of the
PDCs and WDCs at district, regional and national levels. Chris Atim,
secretary-general of the JFM and member of the PNDC, became the first
head of the Interim National Co-ordinating Committee which afterwards
came to be called the National Defence Committee (NDC).
This National Defence Committee (NDC) followed the collectivist
approach to mass mobilization. It wanted to create a 'radical
politica! culture' among the working masses so that they could be
mobilized to undermine the neo-colonial class structure and its
socio-economic, legal and ideological institutions. It organized cadre
schools for the PDCs and WDCs throughout the country. It broadcasted a
special radioprogramme on PDC and WDC activities. With its signature
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tune of 'we no go si t down make them cheat us everyday ...', i t became
very populär among the workers. It also founded a newspaper called
'Nsamankow' , mainly for educational purposes and propaganda. And
finally, it stimulated various actions and demonstrations of workers.
From the very beginning the NDC experienced difficulties with the
PNDC and was accused by Rawlings of trying to form a 'parallel
government' . The 'NDC boys' could count upon large support from the
workers thanks to their efforts of mobil i zing and organizing the
workers and their help in solving their problems with management and
bureaucracy. The NDC began even to be considered as the political
transmission line between the PNDC and the people. As the PNDC did not
seem to formulate any political direction, workers looked to the NDC
for guidance and direction in the revolution. As could be expected,
the NDC was left to chart a course for the PDCs and WDCs and to draw
up guidelines for their Operation.
GUIDELINES FOR THE DEFENCE COMMITTEES
In the exhilarating atmosphere of the early days of the 'revolution'
the PNDC's cal l for the formation of Defence Committees was generally
received by the people with great enthusiasm. The 'people' jubilated
about their newly-won 'power' and started to establish these
'revolutionary organs' within their local communities and places of
work.
It was initially by no means evident to a large proportion of the
Population which people could become members of the Defence Committees
and what exact rol e these committees were supposed to play (Pellow
1983; Konings 1983 and 1984a). The prevailing confusion about the
'proper' rol e of the Defence Committees and the reported 'excesses' of
some of these committees forced the NDC to issue af ter some time the
'Guidelines for the Proper Functioning and Effectiveness of the
Peoples Defence Committees1 (5). In this document the aims and
objectives of the Defence Committees were outlined as follows:
'1. To guarantee that the working people of this country form the
basis of power to carry out the December Revolution, under
the PNDC.
2. To mobil i se the working people to know and defend their
democratie rights, and to organise the affairs of this
- 269 -
country to ensure the availability of their needs, such as
work, food, clothing, and shelter, health and education, etc.
3. To guarantee the domocratic participation of the working
people in the decision-making process in this country, and
[in] the running of the affairs of this nation, their
communities, villages, towns and cities; and their
workplaces, offices and factories.
4. To educate the working people so that they are able to
exposé, fight and conquer their interna! enemies, on all
fronts ...
5. To educate and mobilise the working people to be able to
exposé and successfully combat their external enemies -
especially imperialism - and rid this country of foreign
domination and control over our human and material resources.
6. To mobilise and harness the human and material resources of
the nation for the rapid all round development of our country
and peoples, and to ensure that the efforts at our
developments are based primarily on ourselves.
7. To foster co-operation between our struggling people and the
struggling people of Africa, Latin America and Asia in
particular and the world in general, in their comtnon struggle
against imperialism for genuine National Independente, Social
Justice and Progress, and World Peace'.
The most important tasks of the PDC's would be:
- To take over eventually the administration of local governments in
their areas. For the time being, they should serve as 'watch-dogs of
the revolution' checking corruption, waste, mismanagement, misuse of
state property, smuggling, black marketeering, hoarding, and all other
kinds of 'sabotage of the revolution';
- To supervise the acquisition and the fair and equitable distribution
of goods and services to the people where they can not be achieved by
other means;
- To organise self-help projects;
- To explain and discuss national issues, and see to the
implementation of PNDC and their own decisions.
The most important tasks of the WDCs would be:
- To ensure maximum efficiency, productivity and discipline in the
places of work;
- To protect the genuine interests of the workers and to neutralize
arbitrary behaviour and tendencies on the part of management;
- To eradicate malpractices within the places of work;
- To ensure workers' participation in the decision-making process at
their workshops, and in the country;
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- To supervise the activities of the local union, and any other body
that is supposed to work in the interest of the workers and of the
nation.
The Guidelines made it clear that the PDCs and WDCs were meant to
be class organizations. The class enemies of the working people,
such as managers, chiefs, landlords, and absentee farmers, were,
generally speaking, excluded from membership (6). Politica! education
was regarded as extremely important: a Political Education Unit was to
be set up by the Defence Committees to raise the pol i ti cal
consciousness at the grassroots leve!.
When the Defence Committees started to undertake violent actions
against their class enemies and to protest against the slow and
inconsistent pace of the revolution, some members of the PNDC,
including its chairman, Rawlings, got alarmed. The PNDC engaged more
and more in the task of economie recovery and wanted to involve all
classes in society in this 'national' effort. Class struggle had to be
replaced by class reconciliation. The Defence Committees, apparently
becoming a threat to the PNDC policy of national recovery and
reconciliation had to be controlled and transformed from 'politicaV
into 'economie' organizations co-operating with their 'previous' class
enemies for the sake of national reconstruction.
THE CLAMP DOWN ON THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COMMITTEE (NDC) AND DEFENCE
COMMITTEES
The 'excessive' behaviour of the Defence Committees during the first
months of the revolution and the growing power-hold of the NDC among
the workers gave rise to regulär conflicts within the (original
membership of) the PNDC. The left wing within the PNDC represented by
Chris Atim, head of the NDC, Sgt. Alolga Akata-Pore, in charge of the
Army Defence Committees, and J.A. Kwei, workers' representative within
the PNDC, were strong supporters of the PDC-concept and of increasing
the 'people's power' within the revolutionary process. The right wing
represented by Brig. Nunoo-Mensah and Rev. Damuah, was opposed to the
'political' rol e of the Defence Committees and rather preferred to
transform them into exclusively 'productionist' organs; it was very
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sensitive to the regulär complaints about the Defence Committees'
excessive behaviour on the part of the 'enemies of the revolution1, in
particular management and middle class, and it considered strict state
control over the (politica!) activities of the Defence Committees to
be a contribution to class reconciliation and the predominant task of
economie recovery. The chairman of the PNDC, Flt-Lt. Rawlings, and his
'follower' W.O.I Adjei-Boadi represented the centre of the ideological
spectrum within the PNDC, initially switching regularly between the
right and left wings' positions, one day praising the Defence
Committees and the NDC and the next day launching vicious attacks on
them - thus leaving these 'revolutionary organs' frustrated and
disillusioned.
July 1982 was an eventful month which showed that the PNDC
attitude towards the Defence Committees was as inconsistent and
vacillating as its guidance of the revolutionary process. During this
month Rawlings - disturbed by the growing popularity and power base of
the NDC among the workers and the NDC's uncompromising revolutionary
Position - tried to get a hold over the NDC. lts membership was
widened to include representatives from the Army and Police Defence
Committees who would be more likely to subject themselves to control.
Rawlings appointed himself as chairman of the NDC while Chris Atim was
to act as its secretary. However, these changes did not have any
significant impact on the activities and popularity of the NDC 'boys'
among the PDC militants.
On 29 July 1982 Rawlings confronted with mounting pressure by the
NDC and Defence Committees to state in clear terms the ideological
orientation of the revolution, held one of his most revolutionary
speeches entitled "No Turning Back' (7). It took place during a period
of serious pol itical crisis. On 30 June 1982 three High Court judges
and a retired army offi eer were murdered. These murders appeared to be
politically motivated and PNDC involvement was suspected. The most
outspoken and strongest opponents of the PNDC and the revolution - the
Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB), its mouthpieces
The Echo and The Believer, and the Christian Council of Churches -
demanded the PNDC's resignation. In his speech 'No Turning Back'
Rawlings reviewed the first six months of the revolution. He paid on
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the whole glowing tribute to the Defence Committees, though he did not
neglect to refer to some of their weaknesses and fallures. He accepted
the existence of 'c lasses' in Ghanaian society and the need of 'c lass
struggle'; however, hè only launched a rather mild and ambiguous
attack on the classes that opposed the revolution and its leadership.
Significantly, his answer to the question of the ideological
orientation of the revolution was very vague or, rather, evasive. It
was evident that even in this speech Rawlings was careful not to hurt
too strongly the feelings of the opponents of the revolution and in
fact wanted to 'pacify' them.
On the next day, however, a violent demonstration of the Defence
Committees took place in Acer a organized by the NDC. This
demonstration was the first major attack of the mass organizations on
the 'enemies of the revolution1 who had demanded the PNDC's
resignation in the wake of the murders of the three judges and the
retired army offi eer. Thousands of workers, soldiers and policemen
ransacked the lodges of Freemasons and Odd-Fellows - the secret
associations of the middle classes with an enormous socio-political
power (Pieterse 1982b: 17-19) -, occupied the buildings of The Echo
and The Believer, viciously beating The Bel i ever's editor, and
expressed their total loss of confidence in the 'neo-colonial'
judicial system and called for its rejection: a mock funeral
procession was held towards the precincts of the Supreme Court where a
coffin 'containing the mortal remains of the old judicial system' was
set on fire (8). The Defence Committees appealed to the PNDC to create
'people's tribunals' and a 'people's militia' to deal with the enemies
of the revolution. This violent demonstration of 'people's power'
frightened the middle classes and was strongly disapproved of by
Rawlings and the right wing within the PNDC eager to 'pacify' the
middle classes during the economie and pol itical crisis. The PNDC came
to realize that the Defence Committees could endanger its own policy
of pacification and that 'people's power' had to be tamed rather than
enlarged.
It is beyond doubt that the PNDC's policy of 'c lass
reconciliation' became even more pronounced after its decision to
start negotiations with international finance capital. After secret
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preliminary negotiations with the IMF, the PNDC invited members of the
cabinet and the NDC to two meetings, in August and September 1982, to
discuss the issues of the IMF negotiations and its implications for
the Ghanaian revolution (Konings 1983). The left wing elements within
the 'revolutionary' leadership tried to use this 'IMF debate' to
resolve once and for all certain basic issues like the ideological
direction of the revolution and 'people's power' within the
revolutionary state. During the debate it soon became evident that the
leadership was divided in two broad camps. The left wing within the
PNDC and within the cabinet together with the entire NDC were opposed
to any (further) negotiations with the IMF, and stressed both the
importance of building up a basically independent, self-reliant
economy and the involvement of the people (through the Defence
Committees) and international (revolutionary) allies in the Ghanaian
revolutionary process. The other members of the PNDC (including
Rawlings) and of the cabinet argued that the Ghanaian economy needed a
massive capital injection to 'take off'; they seemed to be inclined to
accept the usually harsh IMF conditions for allocation of funds, even
if this implied a 'temporary' halt to the revolutionary process.
The conditions laid down by the IMF during the preliminary
negotiations with the Ghanaian government delegation, would indeed
have some serious socio-political implications for the Ghanaian
revolutionary process. In addition to the 'normal' austerity measures
(such as a considerable devaluation and a drastic withdrawal of state
subsidies on social services) the IMF demanded a curtailment of the
activities of the Defence Committees (considered to be an obstacle to
higher productivity) and the progressive organizations and a ban on
the latter's attacks on imperialism.
Though the majority vote during these meetings was against
(further) IMF negotiations, Rawlings nevertheless - a clear
manifestation of nis undemocratic leadership style - ordered the
Ghanaian delegation to continue negotiating with the IMF. Rawlings
seemed now to be determined to eliminate from leadership positions
within the revolutionary process all 'those who stood between us and
help from abroad'. A gradual purge of these so-called 'anarchists'
started from October 1982 onwards. The final clamp down came after the
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23st November 1982 coup. A number of NDC members (in particular JFM
cadres) were thrown behind bars on the false allegation that they were
part of the coup. Several leaders and militants of the Defence
Committees were also arrested (a few even murdered). The NDC
Secretariat as wel! as the Greater Accra and Volta Region Secretariats
were dissolved on 25 November 1982.
A nine-member Standing Committee was appointed by the PNDC to
draw up new guidelines for the Defence Committees. The new membership
of the NDC was announced the following year (1983). The inclusion of
chiefs, top bureaucrats, businessmen and representatives of other
fractions of the dominant classes in Ghanaian society among the
membership of the reconstituted NDC was described as a positive
development within the revolutionary process by the 'enemies of the
revolution'. The clamp down on the radical left within the leadership
and the Defence Committees, together with the installation of a
(reconstituted) NDC composed of loyal followers and representatives of
all classes within Ghanaian society, constituted a necessary
prerequisite for an increasing corporatist approach to mass
mobilization.
THE CORPORATIST APPROACH TO MASS MOBILIZATION
After the purge of the left 'extremists' and 'anarchists' the door was
open for co-operation with international finance capita! and a
'national' effort to overcome the economie crisis. On 30 December 1982
the Secretary for Finance and Economie Planning, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey,
presented the PNDC's Programme for Reconstruction and Development - a
four-year programme for national recovery (9). The PNDC's negotiations
with the IMF to accquire the necessary funds for its recovery
programme proved to be successful in the end. In February 1983 it was
reported that Ghana had 'come to terms with the IMF', which was the
start of the supply of substantial loans of international financial
institutions.
The PNDC programme for national recovery with assistance of
international finance had a number of consequences for the
'revolutionary' process and the rol e of the Defence Committees was to
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be attuned to this Programme. The PNDC and the (reconstituted) NDC
laid more emphasis on the following tasks of the Defence Committees
than ever before:
- To prompte class co-operation rather than class struggle. In his
Dawn Broadcast of 6 Maren 1983 which was a complete departure from his
speech of 29 July 1982 entitled 'No Turning Back', Rawlings declared:
'We want to make i t clear that we are not at war with any person
or group of persons. Our revolution is rather against crime and
injustice ... The problems that confront the country are legion.
They are self-induced ... The professionals, men and women of
religion, chiefs, the lodges and everyone should break out of
their insulating walls and Shells and give the national effort a
push ...' (10).
The New Guidelines for the Defence Committees issued in 1983
attempted to control and tarne these 'revolutionary mass organizations'
by depriving them of their class character (11). Membership of the
Defence Committees was no longer restricted to the 'working people':
'membership of the Defence Committees is open to all persons who are
prepared to uphold and defend the basic objectives of the ongoing
revolutionary process and who have a proven record of patriotism,
integrity and democratie practice'. Nothing was said in the New
Guidelines about any legal backing for the activities of the Defence
Committees.
The PNDC's insistence on class reconciliation and co-operation
made it increasingly difficult for the Defence Committees to exposé
even the corrupt dealings of their 'former' enemies. They were often
intimidated, obstructed and physically attacked by chiefs,
businessmen, top bureaucrats and managers in co-operation with the
police and army, the latter becoming the 'leaders of corruption'
within the revolution. It is now continuously stressed that 'people's
power' should not be interpreted as 'working class1 power and that no
class can claim a dominant position within the revolution. The
revolution is a 'national democratie' revolution, a revolution in
which all classes may participate in the decision-making process and
in which 'class alliance' is the watchword.
- To stimulate high productivity. The Defence Committees are
constantly advised by NDC members and other government officials to
promote high productivity. What the government wants to bring home to
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the Defence Committees is that the pol itical activities of the Defence
Committees should be no substitute for productive vork. As the
chairman of the PNDC put i t in August 1983: 'Productive work and
political involvement must go hand in hand' (12). However, it appears
'that the actual position is that political work which dominated the
earlier phase of PNDC rule must now give way to productive work ...
From now on it is more production and less politics. The earlier
question: "Production for whom?" is no longer heard' (Jonah 1984: 27).
- To ensure industrial peace and discipline. The smooth
Implementation of the 'Programme for Reconstruction and Development'
requires, according to the government, industrial peace and discipline
in general in Ghanaian society. The Defence Committees are now
regularly warned by government officials for their lack of discipline:
'We cannot si t and watch unconcerned whilst some workers misinterpret
(people's power) as a licence for lawlessness, irresponsible acts and
complete disregard for law and order' (13). Since August 1983 a number
of government officials have repeated time and again that the
government intended to overhaul all the revolutionary organs in order
to instill more discipline in them.
- To defend the revolution. Political stability is a necessary
prerequisite for economie recovery and development. Since the PNDC
came to power, it has been faced with Opposition both inside and/
outside the country, culminating in various coup attempts. At various
occasions the Defence Committees had appealed to the PNDC to approve
the formation of a people's militia. The PNDC has been hesitating
particularly on this issue. The formation of a people's militia has
always been a very sensitive issue in Ghanaian army circles. It was
only after the 19 June 1983 coup attempt - during which some militants
of the Defence Committees were either killed or wounded - that the
PNDC started to give some military training to selected cadres of the
Defence Committees.
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THE DEFENCE COMMITTEES AND CORPORATIST TENDENCIES
The reaction of the Defence Committees towards government's drastic
actions against 'excesses' and its attempts to erode their 'power' and
control their political activities has been varied.
A large number of them withdrew as much as possible front any
'political1 activities, but remained quite active in economie and
productive activities. An objective record of the Defence Committees1
operations over the past years would show an inspiringly long list of
productive and constructive interventions at the local, regional and
national level, in particular the undertaking of communal works and
the promotion of agricultural production.
Quite a number of the militant members of the Defence Committees
got demoralized and disillusioned by the leadership's 'treason' of the
revolution, the erosion of 'people's power' and their frequent
harassment by government officials and the state's repressive agencies
(army and police). The Defence Committees lost their attractiveness to
workers: more workers seem to leave rather than to join these
'revolutionary organs'. Rawlings confessed during his speech on 6
March 1984 that there was 'evidence of mounting despair, deepening
apathy, and growing withdrawal and rejection of national
responsibility on the part of ordinary people' (14).
Antagonism threatened to add to demoralization after the
announcement of the April 1983 budget (15). This particularly harsh,
IMF-inspired budget appeared to hit the hungry workers - whose real
incomes are said to have fallen in 1983 to 17 per cent of their 1972
level - more than the middle class and the national bourgeoisie. The
budget measures which removed all government subsidies on essential
services and goods, leading to astronomical price rises (the general
level of consumer prices rose by at least 750 to 990 per cent), could
not be compensated by the proposed rise in the minimum wage from $ 12
to (t 21. The Defence Committees had not been previously informed of -
let alone been asked to take part in the decision-making process about
- the budget measures and were caught painfully. Several Defence
Committees seized the announcement of the harsh budget to ventilate
their dissatisfaction with the 'revolutionary' process (Konings 1983,
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1984 a and b). For instance, the Tema Interim Co-ordinating Committee
of WDCs commented as follows:
'The budget was announced at a time when the working people were
beginning to doubt the PNDC's commitment to destroying the social
power of the exploiters and aid the liberation of the oppressed.
In recent times the government has been wooing the enemies of the
people ... On the other hand, militants organized in the defence
committees have not been offered any consistent politica!
support, protection or encouragement by the national leadership.
On the contrary, they are severely attacked for the smal l est
mistake. The people are in a state of pol itical demoralization.
For us, the workers of Tema, therefore, the only basis on which
we can accept the PNDC's budget ..., if we see immediate measures
which aim at deal ing with some of the likely consequences of the
budget, restore the pol itical confidence of the people and attack
the social power of the exploiters who are responsible for the
crisis' (16).
The reaction of the Defence Committees toward the April 1983
budget shows that the Defence Committees are not yet fully controlled
by the government. And these 'revolutionary organs' which are supposed
to mobil i ze the people for the implementation of government pol i ei es,
are still capable of undertaking autonomous actions. These actions
seem to be oriented at the preservation of the original aims of the 31
December 1981 revolution: the establishment of 'people's power' and
the continuation of the class struggle to free Ghanaian society from
internal and external exploitation. It happens now that the Defence
Committees created on the initiative of the 'revolutionary1
leadership, are more 'revolutionary' than the government and try to
push the government into a more revolutionary direction. The Defence
Committees' autonomous actions are mostly not subject to severe
repression and are sometimes successful because the government cannot
easily afford to completely lose the support of the working class, the
last - though shrinking - power base of the PNDC in Ghanaian society.
Various examples of such autonomous actions of the Defence Committees
may be cited:
- The WDCs have taken several actions against those multinational
companies that intended to lay off a considerable number of workers
during the years 1982 and 1983. One historie event was the occupation
and takeover of Ghana Textile Printing (GTP) Ltd., partly owned by
(but under complete management control of) the United Africa Company
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(UAC), in November 1982 (Tarras 1983). Up till now the government has
never formally approved the workers' takeover of the GTP; a number
of official government statements demonstrate that the PNDC does not
favour takeovers and nationalizations so as not to scare off foreign
Investment. Yet, this GTP takeover became an important symbol of
workers' power throughout 1982 and 1983 as other groups of workers
also began serious efforts at the reorganization of production and
distribution. It sparked off a number of other occupations of
transnational-controlled firms, including Juapong Textiles Ltd.,
another UAC-controlled enterprise, and Al lied Foods Ltd., a
Cadbury-Schweppes subsidiary.
- The PNDC cal l for industrial peace and discipline has not received a
satisfactory response from the si de of the workers. One important
reason appears to be that the WDCs - instead of promoting class
collaboration within the industrial firms - rather continue to be a
source of conflict with management. Mr. Ato Austin, Secretary for
Labour and Social Welfare, remarked during his key address delivered
at the 24th Annual General Meeting of the Ghana Employers Association
in May 1984 that 'on the industrial scène we are confronted with
raging conflicts between what is misunderstood as the power of the
people and authority, between what is revolutionary discipline and
order on the one hand and anarchy on the other1. In 1983, according to
him, there had been many conflicts between the WDCs and management. In
many instances the WDCs had taken over the responsibility of sales and
personnel managers and sought to determine the allocation of products
of their respective companies (17). The number of reported strikes
increased from 9 in 1982 to 14 in 1984; a significant number of these
strikes were directed against certain management officers, sometimes
in retaliation of management actions against WDC militants (18).
- The Defence Committees also continued to struggle against the
hostile fractions of the middle class and to attack the ideological
and legal apparatuses of the 'neo-colonial' state. After the 19 June
1983 coup attempt the Defence Committees in the Accra-Tema region
occupied the Supreme Court buildings and two press houses hostile to
the Defence Committees. They announced that they had dissolved the old
judicial system and abolished the post of Chief Justice, and set up
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the nucleus of what they described as a new popularly-elected,
indigenously-derived judicial System. This action not only reflected
the genuine frustration of the workers with the judiciary that always
appeared to favour the 'well-to-do' in society, but also the
impatience of the more militant Oefence Committees with the slow pace
of government efforts to rid the judicial system of its
'conservatism'.
If these autonomous actions of the Defence Committees to bring
about a 'real' revolution in Ghana cannot be channelled and directed
by the PNDC, and if their legitimate demands are not met, they may
lead increasingly to actions at variance with the regime's own
economie and politica! pol i ei es.
CONCLUSION
This study has analyzed the relationship between the 'revolutionary'
leadership in Ghana and the 'revolutionary1 mass organizations, the
Defence Committees, established by the new regime. It has attempted to
demonstrate the various contradictions that developed between the
'revolutionary1 leadership and the Defence Committees in the course of
the revolutionary process, giving rise to serious conflicts (i) within
the leadership about the approach to mass mobilization, and (ii)
between (part of) the leadership and the Defence Committees.
By concentrating on the relationship between the 'revolutionary1
leadership and the Defence Committees and the various contradictions
that relationship gave rise to, this study seems to have overcome some
of the shortcomings of the 'theory of the postcolonial state' I have
dealt with elsewhere (Konings, 1986). First, this 'theory of the
post-colonial state' has often attempted to study the 'class content'
of the post-colonial state in isolation from other classes in society.
Classes, however, can only be understood in relationship to other
classes. Our study about the relationship between the 'revolutionary1
leadership and the Defence Committees in Ghana substantiates to a
large extent Murray's conclusions (1967) about the 'political class1
or ruling 'petty-bourgeoisie' in Ghana: its 'unformed character' and
its 'plasticity'. We have shown how one fraction of the 'ruling petty-
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bourgeoisie' attempted to 'commit suicide' and to mobilize the Defence
Committees for the ultimate establishment of a workers' hegemony
within Ghanaian society. However, its attempts were frustrated and
finally obstructed by another fraction of the 'ruling
petty-bourgeoisie' that - though ideologically identifying with the
working people - actually sought to control the Defence Committees for
the sake of 'national development' and to preserve its hold over the
state and its own class interests.
And second, by focusing its attention almost wholly on the
'ruling class' and the way i t maintains itself in power, the 'theory
of the post-colonial state' presents quite a static analysis. The
'masses' figure in this 'theory' as almost inert, apathetic, and
essentially incapable of undertaking any action to change the status
quo. Our study about the relationship between the 'revolutionary'
leadership and the Defence Committees in Ghana demonstrates that the
'working people' have not yet been fully 'captured' (Hyden 1980) by
the populist leadership's corporatist tendencies; on the contrary,
they have continued to undertake autonomous actions aiming at the
preservation of the 'original aims' of the 31 December 1981
revolution. As the populist government cannot easily afford to lose
completely its - shrinking - support among the masses, these
autonomous actions have proved to be often successful.
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NOTES
1. See Report of the Central Committee of the United Front of the JFM
and PRLG to the Extraordinary Congress of the United Front on the
State of the Front and the Tasks facing the Front in the period
ahead, April 1983.
2. For the short AFRC administration, see Hansen and Col l ins 1980;
Pieterse 1982a; Hansen 1982, Jeffries 1982b; and Konings 1983.
3. See the first speeches of Flt-Lt. J.J. Rawlings after the 31
December 1981 coup as reported in WestAfrica, 11 January 1982,
68-76.
4. Ghana Information Services Department, Policy Guidelines of the
Provisional National Defence Council, Accra, May 1982.
5. For these Guidelines, see Legon Observer, vol. XIV, n° 4, 1982.
6. The Guidelines did not, however, exclude senior officers
completely from membership of the WDCs. They were allowed to
participate in WDC activities i f the workers had vetted them in
public and had confidence in them. To hold office, however, senior
officers should gain not less than 95% of the votes.
7. No Turning Back. A Message to the Nation by Flt-Lt. J.J. Rawlings,
Chairman of the PNDC, delivered on Radio and Television on 29th
July, 1982, Accra: National Defence Committee Press.
8. Ghanaian Times, July 31, 1982, 1.
9. The PNDC's Programme for Reconstruction and Development. Statement
by the PNDC Secretary for Finance and Economie Planning on radio
and television on Dec. 30, 1982, Accra: Information Services
Department.
10. Ghanaian Times. Maren 8, 1983, 4.
11. Guidelines for PDCs and WDCs, reported in The Post, vol. I, n°
10, 1983, 7; and The Post, vol. I, n° 11, 1983, 7.
12. Productivity and Efficiency. Nation-wide Broadcast by the Chairman
of the PNDC, Flt-Lt. J.J. Rawlings, on Sunday, 27 August 1983.
Reported in The Mirror, September 3, 1983, 8-9.
13. Speech of Rawlings held on 16 December 1982, reported in Ghanaian
Times, December 17, 1982, 1.
14. West Africa, 19 March 1984, 597.
15. See Republic of Ghana, Summary of PNDC's Budget Statement and
Economie Policy for 1983. Presented by Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, PNDC
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Secretary for Finance and Economie Planning, on Thursday, April
21, 1983, Accra-Tema: GPC, 1983.
16. Ghanajan Times, April 24, 1983, 1-5.
17. kiest Africa, 7 May 1984, 999.
18. Labour Department, Labourscope, Quarterly Newsletter, Accra,
1982 and 1983 issues.
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